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GO¨DEL’S PROOF: A REVISIONIST VIEW
STEPHEN BOYCE
Abstract. This note presents a revised assessment of Go¨del’s proof. I show
that the proof can be modified to establish that there exists a system P ′ such
that: either P ′ is inconsistent (and P is also inconsistent) or P ′ is consistent
and yet has no model. To define P ′ I firstly present a semantics for Go¨del’s
P, and then define a theory P0 which is syntactically identical to P however
the meaning of the type one variables differs (assuming P is consistent) in
that for any interpretation of P0 these variables range over all and only the
individuals assigned to the P0 numerals. P ′ is the the theory obtained by
adding the negation of a Go¨del sentence for P0 to the proper axioms of P0.
1. Introduction
This note presents a revised assessment of Go¨del’s proof. I show that the proof
can be modified to establish that there exists a system P ′ such that: either P ′ is
inconsistent (and P is also inconsistent) or P ′ is consistent and yet has no model.
To define P ′ I firstly present a semantics for Go¨del’s P, and then define a theory P0
which is syntactically identical to P however the meaning of the type one variables
differs (assuming P is consistent) in that for any interpretation of P0 these variables
range over all and only the individuals assigned to the P0 numerals. P
′ is the the
theory obtained by adding the negation of a Go¨del sentence for P0 to the proper
axioms of P0. To simplify the notation I generally avoid the use of quotation
or quasi-quotation symbols even when precision would be improved by there use,
since this is unlikely to give rise to confusion in the following. I generally follow the
symbolism of [2] though I adapt the symbolism of [3] in defining semantic notions.
The following section describes the system of interest P ′.
2. The system P ′
For brevity I assume familiarity with Go¨del’s system P [2]. To describe the
system of interest P ′ I firstly present a semantics for P - that is, a description of how
to informally define the notions of an interpretation of P , the ’truth’ of a P formula
under an interpretation and so on. The account is essentially a generalisation of the
first-order definitions presented in [3] (with Definitions 3-4 involving paraphrase).
I avoid however any suggestion that the metatheoretical notions can be formalised
in an orthodox set theory or extension of P (c.f. [4]). To present this account
some definitions are used. Firstly the following notion of an interpretation M of
the language of P is used:
Definition 1. An interpretation M of P shall consist of the following:
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(1) The domain D of the interpretation, being a set of objects a, b, . . . (infor-
mally, the individuals over which the type one P variables ’x1’, ’y1’, . . .
range under the interpretation M).
(2) An assignment of some fixed individual (0)M in D to the P constant ’0’
(the numeral zero).
(3) An assignment of an operation (f)M defined on D to the P constant ’f ’
(the symbol for the successor function).
Secondly, the definition of the following classes and sequences of objects / classes
are used:
Definition 2. For M an interpretation of P, the classes σ1, . . . σn, . . ., σ, Σ and
denumerable sequences s1, . . ., sm, . . . are defined as follows:
(1) σ1 shall be D the domain of M and for a natural number n > 1, σn shall be
the power set of σn−1:
(2.1) σn =
{
D if n = 1
℘(σn−1) if n > 1
(2) For a natural number m > 1, sm shall be a denumerable sequence of ele-
ments in σm: s
m
1 , . . ., s
m
n , . . .;
(3) Σ shall be the class of all σ such that: σ includes one, and only one, sequence
sj for each natural number j > 0 and nothing else.
Thirdly, the notion of a P formula c being ’satisfied’ at a certain set σ, as defined
above, is used (c.f. [3]):
Definition 3. For M an interpretation of P, the P formula c shall be satisfied at
σ in Σ if and only if:
(1) c is an elementary formula an(bn−1) and (with an the ith type n variable):
(a) For n > 2, with bn−1 the jth type n−1 variable, we have (for s
n, sn−1
in σ): sn−1j is in s
n
i ;
(b) For bn−1 the numeral m we have (for s
2, s1 in σ): the object assigned
to the numeral m under M is in s2i ;
(c) Otherwise, where bn−1 consists of a sequence of t ’f ’s followed by the
jth type 1 variable v we have (for s2, s1 in σ): the object (f)M [. . . [s1j ]]
- where t applications of the operation (f)M are involved - is in s2i ;
(2) c is a formula ∼ (a) and a is not satisfied at σ;
(3) c is a formula (a) ∨ (b) and σ satisfies a or σ satisfies b;
(4) c is a formula anΠ(b) (with an the ith type n variable): for every σ
′ in
Σ which differs from σ in at most the ith element of the sequence sn of
elements from σn, b is satisfied at σ
′.
Finally, the required notions of truth, and falsity of a P formula under an inter-
pretation, and of an interpretation being a model of P are defined as follows (c.f.
[3]):
Definition 4. For M an interpretation of P, and b a P formula we have::
(1) b is true under M iff b is satisfied at every σ in Σ;
(2) b is false under M iff b is not satisfied at any σ in Σ;
(3) M is a model of P iff every P theorem is true under M.
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To simplify the presentation I assume where convenient that the above notions
provide an adequate account of the notions of truth and falsity for the language of P
(if any such account is possible) and proceed directly to a description of the system
P0. The syntax of P0 is identical to that of P and the semantics differ formally
with respect to just one point, namely Definition 2 Part 1. (Strictly speaking, the
statement in parenthesis at Definition 1 Part 1 should also be replaced with the
following: ’informally, the individuals assigned to the P numerals ’0’, ’f0’, . . . under
the interpretation M’.) The replacement clause of Definition 2 Part 1 for P0 is as
follows (the equation is omitted for brevity): ’σ1 shall be the smallest subset of D
the domain of M that includes (0)M and is closed with respect to the operation
(f)M - hence σ1 includes only the individuals assigned to the numerals under M
((0)M , (f)M [(0)M ], . . .) - and for natural number n > 1, σn shall be the power set
of σn−1’.
We now come to the system of interest P ′. Since the syntax of P0 and P is
identical, the Go¨del sentence of both systems is the same - for brevity x1Π(r). P
′ is
obtained from P0 by adding the negation of this formula, ∼ (x1Π(r)), as a proper
axiom. For P ′ thus defined, we therefore have the following result:
Proposition 1. P′ is either inconsistent (and P is also inconsistent) or P′ is
consistent and yet has no model.
Proof. The proof of Proposition 1 is by cases as follows.
P′ is consistent: By [2] Theorem VI, the hypothesis that P0 is consistent
implies (using 0P0 / ⊢P0 for it is / not provable in P0 etc that):
(1) 0P0 x1Π(r) and
(2) For any P ′ numeral n: ⊢P0 Subst
(
r
x1
n
)
.
Since P ′ is an extension of P0 however 2 implies, given the semantics
for P ′, that x1Π(r) is true in every model of P
′. Yet since ∼ (x1Π(r)) is a
proper axiom of P ′, ∼ (x1Π(r)) is also true in every model of P
′. Thus by
the law of contradiction if P ′ is consistent it has no models.
P′ is inconsistent: If P′ is inconsistent then, by the law of contradiction,
it has no models. But if P′ is inconsistent then x1Π(r) must be provable
in P0 which implies that it is also provable in P and hence that P is also
inconsistent.

I turn now to a brief discussion of the significance of these results.
3. Conclusions
A discussion that relates the above result to the large literature on the Go¨del
phenomenon is beyond the aims of this note. The more limited aim of the discussion
is rather to sketch how the the main arguments of [2] might be recast to assimilate
the above results to the framework that Go¨del employs. Go¨del’s [2] framework
may be roughly characterised as the metamathematical investigation of the very
broad class of systems of interest, conducted in the first instance through a study
of the system P. Viewed from this perspective, the main conclusion established
above does not strictly speaking constitute a paradox: from a purely metamathe-
matical perspective, neither the inconsistency of P nor the existence of a consistent
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theory that lacks a model constitute a contradiction in themselves. Viewed in the
broader context however the analysis provides strong evidence that the formalist
metatheoretic reasoning about such systems is subject to paradox, so that the for-
malist approach fails to provide an adequate account of classical mathematics. In
relation to first-order Peano arithmetic, for example, the demonstration yields the
absurd conclusion that the theory is inconsistent [1]. This evidence from the case
of first-order arithmetic is also important because the semantic metatheory used
in that case involves only a minor revision of the orthodox semantics. While the
theory of truth for P presented above involves some novelties, the comparison with
the first-order case shows that the analysis does is not based solely or primarily on
innovations in the account of truth used.
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